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Giving Kids Their Due: Theorizing a
Modern Fourteenth Amendment
Framework for Juvenile Defense
Representation
Mae C. Quinn
ABSTRACT: This Essay advocates expansion of the right to and role of
juvenile-defense counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment as articulated by
the Supreme Court in In re Gault. It makes this move in light of the
evolution of juvenile-court practices over time and modern understandings
of adolescent development principles. In doing so it takes a different
approach than many advocates and academics who have called for greater
reliance on the concepts established in Gideon v. Wainwright and its
progeny, relating to the right to and role of counsel in adult-criminal
proceedings. Instead it suggests that standards of representation for
juveniles must move beyond the limited “critical stage” and “offensefocused” analyses used under right-to-counsel doctrines that have evolved
under the Sixth Amendment for accused adults.
Given that many facets of juvenile-court prosecutions allow for largely
unchecked discretionary action by judges and court-related actors—both
before and after adjudication—it rejects a trial-centered defense framework
for effective juvenile representation. These ancillary parts of the process, too
frequently below the law and lawyering radar, have the capacity to threaten
youthful privacy, autonomy, and liberty more than a finding of guilt itself.
And given what we now know about the capacities of young people to
process information and make future-based decisions, the guiding hand of
counsel is essential for the entire time a young person is involved with the
juvenile justice system’s web.
Accordingly, this Essay urges revisiting and re-envisioning the right and
role of juvenile counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than
repeatedly mining the Sixth Amendment to establish a more robust

 Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. Many thanks to the law student
organizers of this important Symposium, including Kate Rahel, and their faculty advisor,
Professor James Tomkovicz. I am also grateful to my research assistants Jessica Albert, Claire
Botnick, John Laughlin, and Meredith Schlacter for their contributions to this project.

2185

A14_QUINN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2186

6/23/2014 9:04 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:2185

conception of effective juvenile-court representation. Armed with recent
findings about adolescent development and competence, and in light of the
unique nature of such proceedings as they have evolved over time, we should
fundamentally reconsider lawyer competence within juvenile prosecutions to
ensure greater justice—both procedural and substantive—for court-involved
youth.
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 2187
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CONSTITUTIONALLY ............................................................................. 2190
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INTRODUCTION

For nearly fifty years, clients, courts, and commentators have grappled
with the right to, and role of, juvenile-defense counsel in this country. When
the Supreme Court decided In re Gault in 1967, it provided youths facing
charges in juvenile court with a constitutional right to representation.1 It
also gave young people a range of additional constitutional trial rights,
including timely notice of the charges, the ability to remain silent in the face
of accusation, and to cross examine any witnesses against them.
The Court handed down Gault just four years after it decided Gideon v.
Wainwright2—the landmark decision affording the right to counsel to adults
accused of crimes. But it did not rely directly upon the Sixth Amendment to
support its decision to extend the right of representation in juvenile
prosecutions. Instead, unlike Gideon, Gault looked to the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause for deciding when and what kind
of representation juvenile courts must provide to youth facing accusations.
Over the years, scholars and others have both celebrated and lamented
the Supreme Court’s decision in Gault. It has been cited as an important
part of the Warren Court’s due process “revolution.” But it has also been
criticized as too stingy in the list of protections it provided to court-involved
youth. Many detractors have argued that the Court should have more fully
incorporated the Bill of Rights within juvenile-court proceedings—as was
done for accused adults.
In particular, academics and advocates have faulted Gault for failing to
tap into the Sixth Amendment and its protections. They have repeatedly
urged greater reliance on criminal court right-to-counsel principles to more
fully protect accused youth against substandard representation and serve as
a bulwark against systemic injustice in our juvenile courts. This call has been
renewed and reinvigorated in recent years—particularly given juvenile
courts’ ever expanding reach, more punitive treatment of youth, and
disproportionately negative impact on communities of color.
But this Essay argues our current adult-criminal-justice system and its
provision of appointed counsel are nothing to celebrate—much less
replicate—in the juvenile-justice system. This is especially true if we are
interested in reducing lived injustice for, and improving the life chances of,
vulnerable youth of color. Instead, particularly given what we now know
about the unique nature of both juveniles and juvenile prosecutions, this
paper takes a different tack. Modern understandings of young people, their
ability to understand juvenile-court processes, and our own adult
understanding that juvenile proceedings are becoming ever more complex
and less trial-focused in nature, militate in favor of a more modern and
nuanced approach to the right and role of juvenile-defense counsel.
1.
2.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34–42 (1967).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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It is true that there has been some doctrinal expansion of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in recent years, for instance, to encompass
advice relating to collateral consequences of adult convictions.3 But there
has been backsliding too. More than this, adult-criminal representation has
been largely analyzed as a charge-specific event that does not attach until the
formal prosecutorial process has begun, and is to be afforded in thinly sliced
portions consistent with those stages of the criminal process that are seen as
“critical.”
These doctrines are not sufficiently malleable or robust to provide for
meaningful representation for young persons who find themselves involved
in our more fluid and far-reaching juvenile-justice system. Their legal needs
are more than event- or charge-specific. Indeed, in many states, juvenile
cases continually unfold and grow over many years based upon the
discretionary nature of juvenile-court processes. And a few juvenile
prosecutions actually result in trial on the merits. Instead, youth are more
frequently impacted by pretrial intake and detention processes, dispositional
determinations, post-dispositional placement reviews, and aftercare
requirements.4 Thus a deeper and more holistic understanding of effective
assistance of counsel—one that encompasses all phases of our modern
juvenile-court process—is essential at this time.
Contrary to many advocates and scholars, this Essay argues that a return
to the more pliable and potentially more expansive fundamental fairness
principles espoused by the Fourteenth Amendment may be what is necessary
to further infuse juvenile-court proceedings with meaningful legal and
lawyering standards.
Part II begins by recounting how the right to counsel for juveniles was
first established in Gault under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. It notes that Gault, decided four years after Gideon, stood in stark
contrast to Gideon v. Wainwright, which expressly extended Sixth
Amendment right-to-counsel protections to accused adults in the state court
system. At the time both were heralded as landmark decisions that would
likely change justice systems around the country for the better.
Over the last five decades, Gault has been described as a great
disappointment.5 Given the expanding reach of our juvenile-court systems,
the punishments being imposed in such venues, and their
disproportionately negative impact on children of color, many wonder what
Gault actually accomplished. In particular, juvenile advocates have
repeatedly decried Gault’s seemingly restrictive Fourteenth Amendment
framework and faulted the Court’s failure to analyze the right to and role of
juvenile-defense counsel through a Gideon Sixth Amendment prism. They

3.
4.
5.

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part III.

A14_QUINN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/23/2014 9:04 PM

GIVING KIDS THEIR DUE

2189

claim such a reading, despite Gault’s clear Fourteenth Amendment basis,
could have provided for improved protections and representation for
youth—particularly poor youth of color. Legal scholarship has renewed and
reenergized these arguments in recent years. Many are again calling for
courts to revisit the juvenile right to counsel and infuse it with greater adultlike criminal protections as a way to improve the juvenile-justice system.
Part IV begins to respond to such calls by offering a somewhat different
narrative about the right to criminal-defense counsel post-Gideon. It points
out that Gideon itself has not delivered on its promises—as a matter of
doctrine or in practice. Doctrinally, our right-to-counsel rules have provided
very limited sources of protection. Both offense-specific rules and criticalstage analyses, now dominant rules under the Sixth Amendment, provide for
little more than piece-meal protections.
As for court practices, front-page newspaper headlines inform the world
that the right to counsel in American criminal courts is illusory at best.6
Limited funds, overwhelming cases loads, modern “problem-solving” courts,
and “debtors prison” practices are working to gut Gideon’s potential. And the
thousands of young Black males publically lined up outside of our criminal
courthouses each day demonstrate that the Sixth Amendment has done little
to blunt racial bias in criminal proceedings.
Given this contemporary context, Part V goes on to challenge efforts to
treat youth the same as adults under the Sixth Amendment. As noted, Sixth
Amendment doctrine and procedures provide a bright-line, formalistic form
of representation for accused adults. Such practices are fundamentally at
odds with the more fluid and amorphous components of juvenile-court
proceedings. Similarly, modern social-science data has demonstrated
youthful defendants are far from older defendants in their capacity to
comprehend and make long-term decisions—thus they require different
legal representation and protection standards than those provided for
adults.
In light of our criminal-justice system failings, as well as these
differences between juvenile and criminal courts—in both the individuals
being represented and the proceedings in which they find themselves—Part
VI suggests that it might be time to revisit and reconsider the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It may be possible to further mine due process’s
depths to establish a more meaningful framework for the right to and role
of counsel in juvenile-court proceedings. Returning to the Fourteenth
Amendment analysis applied in Gault, contemporary evaluation of
representational rights would take account of expert opinions and modern
best practices.
Thus this Essay calls for an expansive constitutional conception of
juvenile-defense lawyering—one that moves beyond the specific offense
6.

See infra Part IV.B.
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charged and narrowly framed stages of the process and looks to modern
evolving juvenile-justice standards for guidance. That is, to counter the ways
in which juvenile-court actors increasingly encroach upon the lives and
futures of still evolving youthful defendants, the right and role of counsel
must be similarly rich, responsive, and evolutionary.
II. GAULT

VS. GIDEON DEFENSE COUNSEL: DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONALLY

The facts of In re Gault 7 are so deeply entrenched in our collective legal
recollection that they hardly need repeating. Young Gerald Gault, just
fifteen years old, was summarily adjudicated for allegedly making “lewd”
telephone calls to his neighbor, Mrs. Cook.8 Without being served with a
written factual basis for the charges, presented with testimony from the
complainant, informed of the right to remain silent, or—most importantly
for purposes of this Essay—provided with an attorney to defend him at trial,
he was found to be delinquent by a local juvenile-court judge and
committed to the Arizona State Industrial School until the age of twentyone.9
Before the United States Supreme Court, Gault argued that his rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution had been violated.10
That is, Gault argued that he was denied due process of law because he was
found guilty and removed from his home based on allegations of
wrongdoing without being provided with notice of the charges, the right to
confrontation and against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel.11 The
Court, in a landmark decision that took juvenile courts to task for their
extreme informality and misguided paternalism,12 held that Gault was
entitled to far more under the Fourteenth Amendment.13
As for what “more” meant, the Court declared that “neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”14 Thus,
when addressing testimonial rights and protections, the Gault Court
expressly relied upon criminal cases that extended the Bill of Rights to the
states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 Just as the right against selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment was applicable to state criminal
proceedings by way of the Fourteenth Amendment,16 the Gault Court held

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5–10.
Id. at 10–14.
See generally id.
Id. at 12–31.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 42–57.
Id. at 47.
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the same rule applied to juveniles—even if juvenile-court proceedings might
be technically characterized as civil rather than criminal.17
But somewhat surprisingly, in analyzing Gault’s other challenges, the
Court relied exclusively on the Fourteenth Amendment to extend relief.18
Perhaps most strikingly, the Court applied this analysis to Gault’s right to
representation claim; it did not look to the Bill of Rights and the express
provisions of the Sixth Amendment, as in criminal cases, to define the right
to, and role of, counsel.19 The Court relied solely upon the more malleable
and less clearly established contours of the Due Process Clause to afford
accused youthful offenders the protection of the “guiding hand of
counsel.”20
Notably, the Court did not expressly engage in the kind of due process
balancing that emerged in later civil due process cases.21 That test calls on
courts to consider: (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation of that interest through existing procedures without additional
protections; and (3) the government’s interest in avoiding the safeguards in
question.22 Rather, in support of its mandate of juvenile-defense counsel, the
Gault Court cited extensively to best practices recommended by experts who
had been studying the issue, including federal executive branch agencies,
such as the President’s Crime Commission and federal Children’s Bureau.23
The Court also examined ways in which some states—although far less than
a majority—had already begun the process of providing attorneys to accused
youth.24
Thus the Court applied a somewhat similar approach to the one used in
the past in criminal cases under the broad banner of due process fairness. In
the infamous Scottsboro Boys case, where it first used the term “guiding
hand of counsel” to describe what had been denied the youthful defendants
facing the death penalty, the Court found a right to court-appointment

17. Id. at 49–50.
18. See generally id.
19. Id. at 34–42.
20. Id. at 36.
21. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976); see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
22. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
23. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 38–41; THE CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., THE CHILDREN’S BUREAU LEGACY: ENSURING THE RIGHT TO CHILDHOOD 1952
(2012) (describing the Children’s Bureau’s issuance of juvenile justice standards in 1967,
which were relied on by the Supreme Court in Gault); see also Benjamin E. Friedman, Note,
Protecting Truth: An Argument for Juvenile Rights and a Return to In Re Gault, 58 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 165, 184 (2011) (discussing the impact of the President’s Crime Commission
recommendations on the Gault decision).
24. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 37–38 (noting that in 1967, one-third of states already allowed
for retained counsel, notice of the right to counsel, or appointment of counsel).

A14_QUINN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2192

6/23/2014 9:04 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:2185

representation implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment.25 But Powell was seen
by many as being contextually specific, with the Court noting the special
vulnerability of the defendants there—all were young, Black, uneducated,
contending with a hostile forum, and facing grave consequences.26 And
Powell was also decided well before the 1963 case of Gideon v. Wainwright.
In Gideon, the Court cast aside its prior holding in Betts v. Brady that Bill
of Rights protections did not extend to the states.27 Instead, under Gideon,
indigent accused persons in state court proceedings were granted the right
to a free attorney under the Sixth Amendment.28 Its pronouncement was
broad and bold, declaring that “in our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”29 Borrowing language
from the Scottsboro Boys decision, the Gideon Court spoke about the
defendant’s need for the “guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him,” including to ascertain whether the indictment was
properly filed, evaluate the evidence before trial, and engage in other
pretrial strategizing.30 This expansive and absolute proclamation was
embraced by civil libertarians as launching a sea change in state criminal
courts.
Yet at the time Gault was decided almost no one commented on its
reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment rather than embracing Gideon’s
Sixth Amendment framework. In fact, this point had not even been argued
by Gault’s counsel in his briefs to the Court.31 Gault’s attorney cited Gideon
to support his claim that Gault should have been provided with
representation under the Fourteenth Amendment.32 But he did not cite to
or rely on the Sixth Amendment as a basis for the right to counsel or as a

25. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
26. See, e.g., Eugene Cerruti, Self-Representation in the International Arena: Removing a False
Right of Spectacle, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 919, 936 (2009) (highlighting the Court’s apparently
limiting statement that a right of counsel was needed in “a case such as this” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2034
(2000) (describing the Scottsboro Boys case as “capital-specific”); see also Tom Watkins and
Marlena Baldacci, Posthumous Pardons in 1931 Scottsboro Boys Rape Cases, CNN, (Nov. 21, 2013,
8:15 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/21/justice/alabama-scottsboro-pardons/.
27. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
28. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 344–45 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. See generally Brief for Appellants, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 116), 1966 WL
100787.
32. Id. at 34–39.
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means of interpreting it.33 Nevertheless, Gideon and Gault were both seen as
part of larger civil rights movement undertaken by the Warren Court.34
Indeed, some called the Gault decision “revolutionary.”35 Others
claimed it required an entirely “new philosophy; a pragmatic realization that
an infant is a citizen in his own right and entitled to the full benefit and
protection of the Constitution.”36 But as practices and processes began to
take shape on the ground, most came to see Gault as a pyrrhic victory. The
deep reforms that many thought were presaged simply did not come to pass.
III. DECADES OF GAULT DISILLUSIONMENT AND DREAMS OF GIDEON
DELIVERANCE
Criminologist Anthony Platt was one of the first commentators to
identify Gault’s limited impact. Two years after it was handed down, Platt,
along with collaborator Ruth Friedman, acknowledged that, in the decision’s
wake, several states had passed laws that provided for appointment of
counsel in juvenile courts.37 But they questioned whether Gault’s right to
counsel had much meaning, particularly given the culture of the courts and
continuing confusion about the role of the juvenile-defense attorney.38
In 1969, Platt repeated and expanded these criticisms as part of his
historic book, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency.39 He noted how
“strong ideological and organizational pressure from legislatures, judges,
and legal commentators” still worked to “repress adversary tactics in juvenile

33. See id. In fact, the Sixth Amendment is nowhere referenced in the brief’s Table of
Authorities. Id. at vii.
34. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of
Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 897–98 (2013) (describing the implications of
Gideon and Gault, together, as creating pressures around delivery of indigent defense
representation); Linda S. Mullenix, God, Metaprocedure, and Metarealism at Yale, 87 MICH. L. REV.
1139, 1145 (1989) (describing how legal academia changes in reaction to Gault and Gideon as
part of the due process revolution) (reviewing ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE (1988));
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr, Still Seeking the Promise of Gault: Juveniles and the Right to Counsel, 18 CRIM.
JUST., Summer 2003, at 24–25 (framing Gault as part of the Warren Court’s extended due
process revolution).
35. See Murray M. Milton, Post-Gault: A New Prospectus for the Juvenile Court, 16 N.Y. L.F. 57,
59 (1970).
36. Milton, supra note 35, at 59; see also Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical
Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (1970) (“The eventual result [of Gault] will very likely
be drastic changes in the design and function of juvenile courts.”); Note, Parens Patriae and
Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745, 750 n. 36 (1973) (noting enthusiastic
support of Gault).
37. Anthony Platt & Ruth Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile
Court, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1156, 1162–63 (1968).
38. Id. at 1176–84.
39. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 169 (1969)
(in his chapter about the fate of the Progressive Era child-saving movement, Platt noted that
“[a]lthough the public defender enjoys the contest of a trial, advocacy is nevertheless a limited
commodity” in the juvenile courts he studied).
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court.”40 And more than a decade after these first assessments, Platt warned
that American juvenile courts had yet to evolve. Rather, they presented a
“picture of increasing detention, widespread violations of due process,
institutionalized racism and sexism, administrative chaos, and deteriorating
social services.”41
In the years that followed, others joined Platt’s critiques.42 Many
derided the Court’s failure to more fully embrace criminal-court protections
for juveniles, including the Sixth Amendment framework for courtappointed counsel. One powerful wave of commentary at the end of the
1980s and beginning of the 1990s included the voices of Janet Ainsworth,
Katherine Federle, Barry Feld, and Martin Guggenheim.43 In light of Gault’s
apparent failings, each called for abolition of the juvenile court system and
referral of juvenile matters to the adult-criminal courts.44 These calls were so
persuasive that the American Bar Association considered this possibility at

40.
41.

Id. at 165.
Tony Platt, Lowering Expectations, 88 YALE L.J. 1752, 1754 (1979) (reviewing ELLEN
RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA’S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT (1978)). Practitioners
in the courts agreed with Platt’s observations; writing twenty years later, Irene Merker
Rosenberg described her experience as a New York City juvenile defense attorney in the late
1960s and early 1970s in this way:
The judges were by and large uncaring and ignorant of both the rudiments of due
process and the basic principles of child development and psychology; the
probation department had an overwhelming caseload; and the state facilities in
which the minors were detained and to which they were committed were walking
Eighth Amendment violations.
Irene Merker Rosenberg, Essay, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court
Abolitionists, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 163, 165.
42. See, e.g., Irving R. Kaufman, Book Review, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1052, 1052 (1977)
(reviewing PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD (Margaret K. Rosenheim ed., 1976)) (“Of course,
it is now beyond question that the juvenile justice system has worked badly.”); see also Morales v.
Turman, 326 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Tex. 1971) (describing post-Gault conditions in Texas where
youth were routinely denied counsel in juvenile court prosecutions and placed in substandard
juvenile facilities away from home).
43. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991); Katherine Hunt Federle,
The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the Preservation of Children’s Legal Rights, 16 J.
CONTEMP. L. 23 (1990); Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of
When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185 (1989); see
also Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 723 (1991)
(“Despite its transformation from a welfare agency to a criminal court, the juvenile court
remains essentially unreformed.”); Rosenberg, supra note 41, 174 n.66 (describing this secondwave post-Gault movement, including Martin Guggenheim’s initial support for dismantling
juvenile courts and then change of heart, and her own disagreement with this camp).
44. Interestingly, there was also a critical counter movement that bemoaned Gault for
giving youth too much protection and infusing Gault juvenile proceedings with too much
formal process. In light of this, its adherents also called for the court to be dismantled. See
Michael Kennedy Burke, This Old Court: Abolitionists Once Again Line Up the Wrecking Ball on the
Juvenile Court When All It Needs Is a Few Minor Alterations, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 1027 (1995).
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an annual meeting in 1992.45 But in the end, obviously, juvenile-court
jurisdiction was retained.
Nevertheless, over the last few years, lamentations and proposals for
reform have been revived.46 Advocates and academics have brought new
energy and insights to the juvenile right-to-counsel conversation. Modern
reformers offer these critiques both in light of the history of our juvenile
courts and contemporary conditions encountered there.47 While not
necessarily calling for an end to such institutions, this third wave of postGault reformers has also pushed for infusing juvenile-court proceedings with
greater right-to-counsel protections than presently exist. And nearly all root
their positions in Sixth Amendment norms.
For example, Barbara Fedders has criticized the Supreme Court for not
going far enough in Gault when it provided young people with a right to
counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment.48 Fedders argues that Gault’s
failure to extend its holding beyond the trial process essentially granted
watered down representational rights to juveniles as compared to adults.49
“The scope of the right to counsel for adult criminal defendants,” she
claims, “is broader” than the scope of juveniles’ rights.50 In particular, she
laments the fact that the Gault Court did not expressly address the
application of Sixth Amendment “critical stage” doctrine, which will be
discussed further below.51
Marsha Levick and Neha Desai have similarly catalogued the ways in
which American youth still do not have “access to timely, zealous, and
effective legal representation” in juvenile courts.52 Calling for the provision
of counsel throughout the juvenile-court process—including those stages
45. Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 164.
46. Not all modern critics have expressly acknowledged that they are joining a recurring
debate that has unfolded in waves over the decades. But this author believes it is helpful for
modern reform movements to take stock of similar efforts that have come before. See Mae C.
Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement: Domination of Discourse and Untold Stories of
Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 57 (2009).
47. See, e.g., Lauren Girard Adams et al., What Difference Can a Quality Lawyer Make for a
Child, 38 LITIGATION 29, 31 (2011) (“In too many jurisdictions, children charged with
delinquency offenses are pressured to waive counsel and plead guilty to charges without the
benefit of a lawyer’s assistance.”); N. Lee Cooper et al. Fulfilling the Promise of In Re Gault:
Advancing the Role of Lawyers for Children, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 651, 651–52 (1998)
(describing how the 1990s ushered in a new era for juvenile courts with more public hearings,
less confidentiality protections, greater numbers of youth transferred to adult court, and other
“get tough” practices).
48. Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in
Juvenile Deliquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 782–85 (2010).
49. Id. at 783–84.
50. Id. at 784.
51. Id.
52. Marsha Levick & Neha Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to Ensure Juveniles a
Constitutional Right to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court Process, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 175, 175
(2007).
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not mentioned by the Gault decision which related to trial alone—Levick
and Desai argue that application of Sixth Amendment teachings would
support such an expansive view of effective juvenile representation.53 Also
focusing on “critical stage” doctrine developed in our adult-criminal courts,
Levick and Desai examine various parts of juvenile-court proceedings to
show how an adult in the same situation would be entitled to representation
under the Sixth Amendment.54
Finally, just last year, Robin Walker Sterling, a fellow participant in this
Symposium, offered her own powerful denunciation of Gault.55 Walker
Sterling sees the Court’s failure to provide youth with a Sixth Amendment
right to counsel—rather than their current right to representation under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s fundamental fairness framework—as a lost
opportunity.56 Taking this road, she argues, “exacerbated disparate
treatment of children of color in the juvenile justice system.”57 Indeed, she
asserts that the racial disparity that occurs at various junctures throughout
the juvenile process—including citation versus arrest determinations, intake
and prosecutorial screening, and dispositional decisions—“can be laid at the
feet of the Gault decision.”58
It is hard to disagree with the concerns expressed by modern reformers
about the ever-expanding reach of our juvenile courts—institutions which
ensnare countless youth of color in this country each year, stigmatize them,
demoralize them, impose restrictions on their lives and liberty, and
ultimately work to reduce their life chances.59 But borrowing from
observations offered twenty years ago by Irene Rosenberg during the second
wave of post-Gault lamentations—it appears “underlying the views” of many
of today’s juvenile-court reformers “at least unconsciously, is a somewhat
idealized or romanticized vision of adult courts in which the criminal
guarantees of the Bill of Rights are meaningfully enforced.”60

53. Id. at 183–90.
54. Id.
55. Robin Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road Not Taken, 72
MD. L. REV. 607, 608 (2013).
56. Id. at 614–15 (“Gault’s reliance on a fundamental fairness analysis based in Fourteenth
Amendment due process analysis, instead of on a fundamental rights analysis based in the Bill
of Rights, was a critical misstep.”).
57. Id. at 660.
58. Id. at 662–76.
59. See generally, e.g, Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57
BUFF. L. REV. 1447 (2009); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities
of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383 (2013); Perry L.
Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An Equal Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 285 (2008); Mae C. Quinn, The Fallout from Our Blackboard Battlegrounds: A Call
for Withdrawal and a New Way Forward, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 541 (2012).
60. Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 173 (footnote omitted).
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In fact, Supreme Court Sixth Amendment doctrine developed postGideon provides a rather anemic right to counsel as compared to Gideon’s
rhetoric—one that is even less satisfying as practiced and applied in modern
trial-level courts. Thus merely applying Sixth Amendment doctrine to
juvenile cases may do more harm than good by artificially cabining the kind
of nimble and creative youth advocacy that needs to be delivered in juvenilecourt proceedings. And it is possible there is greater space in the Fourteenth
Amendment to allow for the development of a right to, and role of, juveniledefense counsel that is both age-appropriate and holistic in its contours.
IV. BEING CAREFUL ABOUT WHAT WE WISH FOR: GIDEON’S LACKLUSTER
LEGACY
A. LIMITED AND LIMITING LEGAL DOCTRINES
Sixth Amendment rules that have developed post-Gideon hardly provide
a robust rights-protecting framework. The right to appointed counsel
applies only when a formal case is pending against a defendant and, even
then, in limited, purportedly “critical,” moments during the prosecution.
Accordingly, the constitutional role of counsel has been conceptualized in a
restricted way that requires meaningful representation at a few flash points
in the process and not in a continual and comprehensive manner. These
standards have been repeatedly criticized as being too narrow and
formalistic—even for framing the right to, and role of, counsel in adultcriminal courts.
Nearly a decade after Gideon was decided, the Court clarified in Kirby v.
Illinois that an individual does not have a right to appointed counsel under
the Sixth Amendment until the adversary process has started.61 Over time
the Court has provided further guidance about what this means in the
criminal-court context. For instance, a decade after Kirby, in United States v.
Gouveia, the Court explained that the “formal criminal proceeding[]” marks
the moment when the right to counsel attaches for adult defendants.62 The
following year it expanded on this view in Moran v. Burbine, noting that only
after the government moves its focus from the investigation to accusation
phase does a defendant require the assistance of a lawyer.63 More recently,
in Rothgery v. Gillespie County, the Court made clear that appointment of
counsel is required for arraignment and bail hearings, even if a prosecutor is
not present.64 But the focus was still on the government’s decision to
formally prosecute and the institution of the adversarial process.65

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688–91 (1972) (plurality decision).
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984).
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431–32 (1986).
Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
Id.
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Beyond the moment when the formal prosecution process begins, and
during trial, adult-criminal defendants are entitled to representation only
during other parts of the criminal process that are considered similarly
“critical.”66 The Court has held that such stages include post-indictment
interrogations,67 post-indictment lineups,68 preliminary hearings,69 and
sentencing proceedings.70 To determine whether any other stage or phase of
the criminal process is critical, trial courts have been directed to ask
“whether potential substantial prejudice to [the] defendant’s rights inheres
in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that
prejudice.”71 Courts have used this test to find that the right to counsel does
not attach at numerous other parts of the criminal process, including certain
kinds of motion litigation,72 pre-sentence probation interviews,73 and
supervised release proceedings.74
The Sixth Amendment’s right to representation is also limited to those
cases in which the right has formally attached. This is because the Court has
held that Sixth Amendment protections are charge- and offense-specific.75
The state has been permitted, therefore, to gather information from a
defendant about other matters that are not the subject of the pending case
in which representation has been provided.76 Thus, as many commentators
have noted, taken together, these rules have largely worked to restrict the
expansive right to, and role of, counsel suggested by the Sixth Amendment’s
own text and Gideon’s rhetoric.77
66. See, e.g., Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695–96 (2002) (“A trial would be presumptively
unfair, we said, where the accused is denied the presence of counsel at ‘a critical stage’ . . . .”
(citing United States v. Cronic, 566 U.S. 648, 659 (1984))).
67. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
68. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967).
69. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970).
70. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357–62 (1977); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137
(1967).
71. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
72. See, e.g., Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding no right to counsel at a
hearing where the court consolidated defendant’s case with those of other defendants charged
with involvement in the same crime); Runnels v. State, 896 P.2d 564 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995)
(finding no right to counsel where motion for new trial not essential to preserving issues for
appellate review).
73. See, e.g., Stuart v. State, 180 P.3d 506 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007) (finding no right to
counsel at a “routine presentence interview” because collecting largely publically available data
differs from a psycho-sexual evaluation).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding no right to
counsel at federal supervised release hearing).
75. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
76. See id. at 180–81.
77. See, e.g., Brooks Holland, A Relational Sixth Amendment During Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381 (2009); Michael J. Howe, Note, Tomorrow’s Massiah: Towards a
“Prosecution Specific” Understanding of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
134 (2004).
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For instance, Pamela Metzger, law professor and former public
defender, has argued that the right to counsel contemplated by the brightline “critical stage” analysis is largely out of step with norms of modern
criminal-court proceedings.78 Such a mechanistic test focusing on
confrontational and adversarial features of the process overlooks too many
parts of contemporary criminal prosecutions—which are far less trial
focused than in days past—where a defendant can be prejudiced without the
assistance of a trained lawyer.79
Others have offered similar critiques of the “charge focused” and
“offense specific” doctrines that have emerged post-Gideon. Even former
federal prosecutors have warned these rules are frequently applied in a rigid
manner that fails to account for modern criminal law practices.80 They
overlook delays in formal charging decisions and other more subtle
practices that work to keep government conduct off of the Sixth
Amendment radar.81 Allowing the prosecution to hide behind these
doctrines, they argue, can work to prevent “fair and unfettered access” to a
lawyer.82
It is true that in the last few years the Supreme Court has revisited the
concept of effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, in
part acknowledging some of the critiques above. For instance, in 2010, it
decided Padilla v. Kentucky, which expanded an attorney’s professional duty
to advise a client of the collateral civil immigration consequences of a guilty
plea.83 Failure to do so now may support an ineffectiveness claim.84 And this
past year in Missouri v. Frye85 and Lafler v. Cooper,86 the Court affirmatively
enhanced defense-attorney effective assistance duties in the context of
counseling around guilty pleas, even where immigration consequences were
not present. This series of cases has caused some to suggest we have entered
a new defendant-favoring era under the Sixth Amendment, one that is less
78. See, e.g., Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel
Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1636 (2003) (“The rhetoric of the Sixth Amendment is grand;
the reality is grim.”).
79. See id. at 1689; see also In re Carter, 848 A.2d 281, 298–99 (Vt. 2004) (citing to
Metzger’s work in finding that an interview by probation staff constitutes a time when the Sixth
Amendment right to appointed counsel applies, even if it is a “non-adversarial” event).
80. James S. Montana, Jr. & John A. Galotto, Right to Counsel: Courts Adhere to Bright-Line Limits,
16 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. MAG. 4 (2001), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
criminal_justice_magazine_home/crimjust_cjmag_16_2_montanta.html (“Two related principles—
that the right only attaches at the commencement of formal judicial proceedings and that the right is
“offense specific”—remained intact because the Supreme Court adopted and endorsed a formalistic
approach to the Sixth Amendment.”).
81. Id. at 9–10.
82. Id. at 5.
83. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486–87 (2010).
84. Id. at 1486.
85. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
86. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).

A14_QUINN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2200

6/23/2014 9:04 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:2185

trial-centered and better rooted in the realities of current criminal-court
practices.87
But these cases must also be considered in light of other contemporary
decisions that work to restrict the right and role of defense counsel under
the Sixth Amendment. For instance, in a different but related series of
decisions, the Supreme Court recently diluted the defendant’s right to
counsel by suggesting Miranda warnings are enough to protect the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel even after counsel has been
appointed.88 So while the government was previously precluded from using
information gathered from a represented defendant about the subject of his
pending case,89 it may be able to do so now so long as the defendant has
been reminded of his rights under Miranda and appears to waive those
rights.90
Therefore, the actual doctrinal implications and impact of these new
decisions, taken together, has yet to be seen.91 And as was powerfully
recounted by others at this symposium, as it stands now, day-to-day Sixth
Amendment realities in our adult-criminal courts remain grim.
B. PROMISE IN PRACTICE: FIFTY YEARS OF FAULTY REPRESENTATION
Gideon, just as much as Gault, has traveled a troubled path,
disappointing critics, criminal defendants, and communities along the way.
The modern adult criminal-court system contributes to the degradation and
lived injustice experienced by many indigent accused persons—particularly
young men of color—even with Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in place.
Thus, the criminal-justice system in this country is nothing to celebrate—or
replicate—as we consider how to best protect and represent accused
minority youth.92

87. See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1162–63 (2012) (asserting that Lafler and Frye “reject[ed] a cramped,
formulistic view of the right to counsel” and will “have immediate and far-reaching
implications”).
88. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090–91 (2009); see also Berghuis v.
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010).
89. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 635 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
397–98 (1977).
90. Montego, 129 S. Ct. at 2091; see also Geoffrey M. Sweeney, Casenote, If You Want It, You
Had Better Ask for It: How Montejo v. Louisiana Permits Law Enforecement to Sidestep the Sixth
Amendment, 55 LOY. L. REV. 619 (2009).
91. See Jed Rakoff, Frye and Lafler: Bearers of Mixed Messages, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25, 27
(2012) (“[T]he long-term influence of these cases in subtly discouraging defense counsel from
taking aggressive positions on behalf of their clients, or just from taking the time necessary to
develop a full defense, may be to harm the defendants themselves.”).
92. “In determining whether to abandon the juvenile courts because of the disparity in
protection, it is also necessary to make a realistic assessment of the constitutional safeguards
available in the criminal courts.” Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 171.
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In Gideon, the Supreme Court made clear that individual states needed
to financially support indigent defense services.93 Pointing out that “vast
sums of money” were being spent “to establish machinery to try defendants
accused of crime,” including to hire prosecutors, the Court warned that
defense lawyers need to be seen as similar “necessities, not luxuries.”94 Even
as it expanded the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to misdemeanor cases
in Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court rejected the idea that claims of limited
resources could be used to hinder delivery of defense services.95 But fifty
years later, states are still sidestepping Gideon’s mandate. Many defender
programs are all but crumbling under the weight of ever increasing
caseloads while watching their budgets diminish.
The New York Times reported on requests by the Missouri’s publicdefender system to turn away cases. The state’s high court ruled in favor of
the defender system, acknowledging offices did not have enough lawyers or
money to handle all of the cases being assigned.96 The Missouri Supreme
Court suggested public defenders and judges should work together to ration
representation resources.97 But, of course, as noted forty years ago in
Argersinger, purportedly minor matters—including juvenile prosecutions—
can have major consequences.98 In addition, when they began turning away
cases consistent with the Court’s order, Missouri public defenders suffered
tremendous backlash.99 The Governor withheld $1.4 million from the
system—money that was already promised under a budget signed into law.100
Other defender systems are contending with similarly impossible
burdens and political battles.101 In the South, the Knox County Community
Law Office in Tennessee, led by nationally respected director Mark

93. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
94. Id.
95. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (1972).
96. Monica Davey, Budget Woes Hit Defense Lawyers for the Indigent, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/us/10defenders.html?pagewanted=all.
97. See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 887 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
98. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40.
99. Editorial Board, Editorial: Piling On the Missouri Public Defender System, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (Nov. 1, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/theplatform/editorial-piling-on-the-missouri-public-defender-system/article_1abd346f-4301-566a9ecf-aecca130bf61.html.
100. Mike Lear, Public Defenders Warn of Hiring Freeze, Furloughs, MISSOURINET (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://www.missourinet.com/2013/10/24/public-defenders-warn-of-hiring-freeze-furloughs/.
Public defender administrators confirmed a hiring freeze as of November 1, 2013, declaring, “It’s a
very serious situation. It’s not good for our employees, it’s not good for our clients and it won’t be
good for victims and local county jails that will have folks waiting in jail longer.” Id.
101. In some states, the battle has involved simply creating a public defender system in the
first instance, as in Michigan. See Tanya Greene, Victory! Michigan Turns the Corner on Public
Defense Reform, ACLU (July 1, 2013, 4:55 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-lawreform/victory-michigan-turns-corner-public-defense-reform.
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Stephens, brought a lawsuit in the hopes of addressing its expanding
caseloads.102 Rather than getting the relief sought, government officials are
now focused on Knoxville defenders as being overpaid, because they spend
$369 per case—more than the state average of $291.103 Georgia,104
Louisiana,105 and Florida106 are facing similar challenges as they represent
more indigent defendants each year than professional standards allow.
Northern states are struggling too. Pennsylvania’s Luzerne County
Public Defender’s Office sued government officials to try to access sufficient
funds to handle its crushing caseload,107 as have offices in New York.108 Even
the Federal Public Defender System has been forced to operate under
impossible conditions. American Bar Association President James R. Silkenat
has publically berated Congress for what it has done to federal defender
funding, calling its actions an “embarrassment” in the face of our country’s
commitment to the “rule of law.”109 And New York’s Chief Federal Defender,
David Patton, has conceded that his staff is “outgunned” by the prosecution,
where he has thirty-eight lawyers to defend against three-hundred Assistant
United States Attorneys in his region.110
In some places, as part of the effort to reduce defender caseloads, piecemeal solutions of no-jail misdemeanor dockets and “problem-solving” courts
are being offered as alternatives to adversarial criminal-court proceedings.
In many such venues, defense attorneys are dispensed with as unnecessary.
But, unfortunately, these “innovations” often result in the same kind of
sanctions and liberty deprivations as traditional courts—albeit on a slower
schedule—all without the benefit of legal counsel or counseling.

102. Jamie Satterfield, Cost for Concern: Knox County Spends Most in State on Indigent Legal Services,
KNOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 21, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/aug/21/costfor-concern/.
103. Id.
104. Emily Green, State Slapped with Lawsuit over Indigent Defense, S. CENTER FOR HUM. RTS. (Dec.
15,
2009),
http://www.schr.org/action/resources/state_slapped_with_lawsuit_over_indigent_
defense.
105. John Simerman, Public Defender Sues New Orleans Traffic Court over Unpaid Fees, TIMESPICAYUNE (July 31, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/07/public_
defender_sues_new_orlea.html.
106. Jim Saunders, Miami-Dade Public Defender Allowed to Pull out of Cases Because of Workload,
MIAMI HERALD (May 23, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/23/3412933/miamidade-public-defender-allowed.html.
107. John Rudolf, Pennsylvania Public Defenders Rebel Against Crushing Caseloads, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 16, 2012, 11:18 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/30/pennsylvaniapublic-defenders_n_1556192.html.
108. Alysia Santo, Still No Resolution in Public Defender Suit, TIMES UNION (Sept. 25, 2013, 6:50
AM), www.timesunion.com/local/article/Still-no-resolution-in-public-defender-suit-4840560.php.
109. ABA President Rails against Budget Cuts to Federal Public Defender Program, A.B.A (Aug. 23,
2013, 12:27 PM), http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2013/08/
aba_president_rails.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id.
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For instance, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
recently undertook The Misdemeanor Project to evaluate practices within
low-level criminal courts across the country.111 The Project focused on
venues where Argersinger is still being interpreted—despite the Supreme
Court’s decision in Alabama v. Shelton112—to apply only when the defendant
is sentenced to imprisonment. They found that while many defendants were
not sent to jail on the spot, they left court with the threat of incarceration
hanging over their head with suspended and other complex sentence
agreements.113 Yet they entered guilty pleas and received such deferred
sentences without the assistance of appointed counsel.114 And, of course,
many of these defendants were left with significant collateral consequences
from their convictions—consequences no lawyer ever told them about.115
Even in cases where fines are imposed on unrepresented poor persons,
it is often just a matter of time before they are incarcerated for lack of
payment in a manner that is reminiscent of debtors prisons of days past.116
Similarly, in the thousands of “problem-solving” courts that have cropped up
across the country incarceration is all too frequently delayed—not
avoided.117 These courts are popular because of their purportedly nonadversarial approaches.118 Yet, participants may be jailed and otherwise
deprived of their liberty at “review” hearings without an attorney to advocate
for them.119 It should come as no surprise, therefore, that in many states

111. See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE
WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009), available at
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/misdemeanor_20090401.pdf; see also
Maureen Dimino, Misdemeanor Courts are in Need of Repair, 33 CHAMPION 36, June. 2009 (recounting
her work as a NACDL court observer for the Misdemeanor Project).
112. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (holding that an indigent defendant
should be provided with counsel even if a jail sentence will be suspended or probated).
113. BORUCHOWITZ, BRINK & DIMINO, supra note 112.
114. Id.; see also Dimino, supra note 111.
115. Dimino, supra note 111; see also Keith Rushing, Virginia’s System of Waiving Jail Time and
Legal Counsel for Minor Offenses Boosts Deportations, RTS. WORKING GROUP (Jan. 31, 2013, 11:08
AM), http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/content/virginia%E2%80%99s-system-waiving-jailtime-and-legal-counsel-minor-offenses-boosts-deportations.
116. See Ethan Bronner, Poor Land in Jail as Companies Add Huge Fees for Probation, N.Y. TIMES (July
2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/us/probation-fees-multiply-as-companiesprofit.
html; Alain Sherter, As Economy Flails, Debtors’ Prisons Thrive, CBSNEWS.COM (April 5, 2013, 12:39 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/as-economy-flails-debtors-prisons-thrive; Op-Ed., Return of Debtors’
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/ 14/opinion/return-ofdebtors-prisons.html(“[J]udges routinely jail people to make them pay fines even when they have no
money to pay.”).
117. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 46, at 66–67.
118. Id. at 59–62.
119. Id. at 65–67; see also Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public
Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 37, 64 (2000).
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where public defenders are least supported, like Missouri, “problem-solving”
courts are supported most. 120
Not only does the current system ensure that some of the country’s
most vulnerable citizens remain forever under the weight of poverty,121 but
most of those poor are young Black males.122 As has been well documented
by Michelle Alexander,123 Paul Butler,124 Bryan Stevenson,125 and others in
recent years, contemporary criminal courts maintain a de facto caste system
that has historically disenfranchised and dehumanized persons of color.126
We need to look no further than the sidewalks that surround our
criminal courts as they open for business each day to bear witness to the
shaming and stigma that we heap onto thousands of young AfricanAmerican men—many for the most trivial of alleged wrongdoings.127 These

120. See Marshall Griffin, Mary Russell to Become Chief Justice of Mo. Supreme Court Next Week,
ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (June 26, 2013, 6:38 PM), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/maryrussell-become-chief-justice-mo-supreme-court-next-week (noting the expansion of specialty
courts as one of the top priorities for Missouri’s court system); Drug Court Facts, MO. ASS’N OF
DRUG CT. PROF., http://www.modrugcourts.org/showpage.php?page=5 (last visited May 20,
2014) (claiming Missouri drug courts “are a proven cost-effective method for diverting nonviolent offenders from incarceration in prisons”); Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission,
WEBPAGE - PUBLIC INFORMATION, http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=250 (describing seven
different kinds of problem-solving courts where “[t]he treatment team may”—or may not—
include a defense attorney).
121. See Tracy Velázquez, “Criminalizing” Poverty, SPOTLIGHT ON POVERTY & OPPORTUNITY
(Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.spotlightonpoverty.org/ExclusiveCommentary.aspx?id=5f13e0fea47d-4ce4-a945-187fc331e81d (noting that after poor people are released from incarceration,
“they are relegated to poverty once again because of the punitive barriers society has set up to
prevent their success”).
122. See John Tierney, Prison and the Poverty Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/science/long-prison-terms-eyed-as-contributing-to-poverty.
html (quoting a Harvard sociologist as declaring prison “has become a routine event for poor
African-American men and their families, creating an enduring disadvantage at the very bottom of
American society” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
123. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
124. See generally PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2009).
125. See Eva Rodriguez, Bryan Stevenson, the Man Behind the Juvenile Justice Cases Decided by the
Supreme Court, WASH. POST (June 25, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-25/
lifestyle/35459355_1_juvenile-justice-cases-violent-crime-juvenile-offenders (detailing Stevenson’s
work toward abolishing mandatory life imprisonment for juveniles, most of whom were “poor and
kids of color”).
126. Cf. Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of
Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 887–88 (2013) (describing the “race-and-crime”
and “race in criminal justice” narratives arising during the Warren Court period); James
Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21,
58–61 (2012) (comparing the impact of mass incarceration on various racial populations).
127. Robin Steinberg, Addressing Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System Through Holistic
Defense, THE CHAMPION, July 2013, available at http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=29517
(“Racial disparity in the criminal justice system is a problem with which public defenders are
intimately familiar. They see it every day in courthouses across the country where people of
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images leave all viewers with a definite understanding of who is and who is
not deserving of life and liberty in this country. They deliver messages far
louder than the promises of Gideon that seem like whispers from decades
ago. And for these individuals—while on public display and while they carry
the long-term consequences of their court involvement—the Sixth
Amendment provides little solace.128
V. FURTHER MAKING THE CASE FOR SEEING THINGS DIFFERENTLY: COURTS
AND KIDS
It is against this backdrop that this Essay questions the call to adopt the
same Sixth Amendment protections and practices in our nation’s juvenile
courts. It is true that Gault has yet to fully deliver; many youth still negotiate
our juvenile-justice system without counsel, let alone quality representation.
More than this, today’s juvenile-court prosecutions—no different from those
in our criminal courts—disproportionately impact minority youth, working
to entangle them in the justice system while reducing their life chances. But
adding further doctrinal restrictions and Sixth Amendment formalism
around juvenile representation would not improve the situation nor result
in greater support and empowerment of such youth. Turning to another
broken system for solutions seems like no new way forward at all.
Instead, this Essay offers a different possible approach that focuses on
the important differences between contemporary juvenile and criminal
courts—and contemporary understandings of juveniles and adult
defendants. Thus, rather than fight for kids to be treated like adults under
Gideon, it may be time to try to breathe greater life into Gault to better
inform the right to, and role of, defense counsel for youth. In doing so we
might be able to finally establish a meaningful constitutional due process
theory of juvenile representation—one that not only accounts for the
entirety of the juvenile justice process with all of its “peculiar” features but
also holds the system accountable.129
A. DISPOSITIONAL AND OTHER DIFFERENCES IN THE COURTS
In Gault the Court described two cornerstone components of American
juvenile courts—rehabilitation interventions and protective informal
procedures.130 The Court did not strike down these features, but warned

color from low income communities line the crowded hallways, fill the courtroom benches, and
sit at the defense table in staggering and disproportionate numbers.”).
128. See generally Regina Austin, “The Shame of It All”: Stigma and the Political
Disenfranchisement of Formerly Convicted and Incarcerated Persons, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 173
(2004); Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice as Environmental Justice, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1
(1997); SpearIt, Legal Punishment as Civil Ritual: Making Cultural Sense of Harsh Punishment, 82
MISS. L.J. 1 (2013).
129. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
130. See id. at 16–19.
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that they can serve as double-edge swords if not managed appropriately.131
Its decision to guarantee counsel in juvenile matters was intended not only
to help youth defend against accusations, but to assist them to negotiate
juvenile court’s amorphous proceedings and ensure their regularity.132 So
while the Court limited its express findings to the adjudication hearing—
leaving to another day the “pre-judicial stages” and “post-adjudicative . . .
process”133—it was quite clear that meaningful defense representation was
intended to serve as a check on the good intentions and broad discretion
present in juvenile-court practices.134
If the juvenile process was “peculiar” and difficult for a child to fully
comprehend in the 1960s, it has become labyrinthine today.135 Many agree
that juvenile-court proceedings are far more complex and complicated than
adult-criminal-court matters.136 The process may include intake proceedings
where juveniles are interviewed by state actors, pre-prosecution efforts to
refer children to treatment programs, detention hearings, complex guilty
plea offers, dispositions that can result in long-term direct and indirect
consequences, and certification proceedings that result in a child facing
adult prosecution and a sentence of life behind bars.137 Thus, juvenile-court
features and practices are incredibly idiosyncratic and require deeply
specialized knowledge to understand and meaningfully negotiate.138
Beyond this, the life cycle of a juvenile case is generally quite different
from that of a criminal case. Given their often discretionary and
indeterminate nature, the end of a case may be impossible to predict.139
Youth may be required to return to juvenile court for multiple review

131. Id. at 15–21.
132. Id. at 36 (“The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to . . . insist upon regularity of
the proceedings . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
133. Id. at 13; cf. Fedders, supra note 48, at 783 (lamenting the Gault Court’s failure to
address the right to juvenile-defense counsel beyond the trial context, but acknowledging that
pre- and post-trial representation was “not at issue in the factual context of Gault”).
134. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
135. See Mark Ells et al., Unraveling the Labyrinth: A Proposed Revision of the Nebraska Juvenile
Code, 82 NEB. L. REV. 1126, 1130 (2004) (recounting how the Nebraska Supreme Court
referred to one piece of juvenile court litigation as “labyrinthine”) (quoting Wheeler v. D.D. (In
re Interest of L.D.), 398 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Neb. 1986)).
136. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles About
the Collateral Consequences of Adjudications, 6 NEV. L.J. 1111 (2006).
137. See Sue Burrell, Contracts for Appointed Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Cases: Defining
Expectations, 16 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 314, 360–61 tbl. 3 (2012); see also Levick & Desai,
supra note 52, at 184–91 (examining juvenile procedure in light of the Sixth Amendment).
138. See generally Burrell, supra note 137.
139. See Jeffrey K. Day, Comment, Juvenile Justice in Washington: A Punitive System in Need of
Rehabilitation, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 399, 434–35 (1992) (describing how the
indeterminancy in juvenile court dispositions leaves the court with great discretion to decide
what kind of intervention to order and when to end the case); see also Levick & Desai, supra note
52, at 181 (“[J]uvenile court dispositions . . . are indeterminate . . . .”).
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hearings to see how they are doing on a rehabilitative path.140 This is
because, unlike adult-criminal courts, juvenile courts take jurisdiction over
the youth before them: it is not so much a particular charge but the child
herself who falls under the court’s review. Thus a disposition may be
modified or expanded to include any number of additional claims and
concerns that arise during the course of the court having jurisdiction.141 In
such proceedings, the “phase” or “stage” of the process may become murky
and difficult to define.
More than this, the extent to which social work, mental health, and
substance abuse interventions are part of the fabric of the court and its
workings also makes juvenile court different from criminal courts.142 It is
true that in the last twenty years more adult-criminal courts have attempted
to become “problem-solving” through their use of treatment interventions
instead of incarceration. But such practices remain discrete outliers in a
system that centers on incarceration.143 In fact, such “innovative” efforts have
been compared to long-standing norms and practices in juvenile court.144
Contemporary Sixth Amendment rules do not account for these
unusual and complex features of juvenile court. Nor are they—with their
formalism and inflexibility—well-suited as standards for establishing the role
of counsel in such proceedings. Therefore, assuming we do not dismantle
the juvenile-court system in its entirety, which most of today’s reformers do
not advocate, it is clear that simply importing Sixth Amendment
representational rules into today’s juvenile proceedings will not adequately
serve or protect youth.
B. DEVELOPMENTAL AND OTHER DISTINCTIONS IN DEFENDANTS
Not only are juvenile court proceedings different from those in our
criminal courts, but those who stand accused are obviously quite different
too. Referring to fifteen-year-old Gerald as a mere “boy” as it contrasted him
to “adults” prosecuted in our criminal courts,145 the Gault court was very
much concerned with how juveniles’ lack of sophistication impacts them in

140. Levick & Desai, supra note 52, at 181 (“Some jurisdictions provide for formal judicial
review of a youth’s progress in placement or on probation . . . .”).
141. See Jim Moye, Don’t Tread on Me to Help Me: Does the District of Columbia Family Court Act of
2001 Violate Due Process by Extolling the “One Family, One Judge” Theory?, 57 SMU L. REV. 1521,
1526 (2004).
142. Burrell, supra note 137, at 347–49 (discussing the need for appointed counsel to learn
about the specific features of juvenile cases and issues specific to adolescents).
143. See Quinn, supra note 46.
144. See Daniel M. Filler & Austin E. Smith, The New Rehabilitation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 951,
955–82 (2006) (discussing the history of juvenile courts and the creation of specialty juvenile
courts); Nadav Zamir, Problem-Solving Litigation for the Elderly: An Eventual Shift with a Cautionary
Approach, 25 J. C. R. & ECON. DEV. 1023, 1040–41 & n.104 (2011).
145. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27–29 (1967).
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our courts.146 Since then, the Court’s intuition about the differences
between young people and adult defendants has been scientifically proven
and more concretely explored by youth advocates and academics.147
Over the last decade, findings in neuroscience, biology, and psychology
have informed modern understandings of the capacity of young people.148
We now know youth are less likely to comprehend legal jargon than
adults.149 They are also developmentally less able to resist pressures of
others, comprehend consequences, and make future-oriented decisions.150
These findings have been extensively cited by the Supreme Court in its most
recent decisions relating to juveniles, holding that youth are categorically
less culpable than adults.151 The Court has now jurisprudentially embraced
these differences in establishing different youth-centered rights and rules
under both the Eighth and Fifth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.152
VI. GOING BACK TO GAULT: TOWARDS A MODERN FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
FRAMEWORK
In light of the differences between criminal and juvenile courts—in
both the people being represented and the proceedings in which they find
themselves—it seems clear the doctrines and standards that have evolved
under the Sixth Amendment are not sufficiently robust or nuanced to
account for the needs of young people in our juvenile-justice system. Thus,
as this Part will suggest, perhaps it is time to return to the Fourteenth
Amendment to further mine its depths for a more meaningful framework
for the right to, and role of, counsel in juvenile-court proceedings.
146. Id. at 48 (noting that confessions obtained from children and adolescents need to be
received with distrust).
147. See, e.g., Jahaan Shaheed, The “Amorphous Reasonable Attorney” Standard: A Checklist
Approach to Ineffective Counsel in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 905, 911 (2011) (“To
have the capacity to assist counsel, juveniles must receive information from their attorneys,
properly comprehend this information, and understand the implications of the information
that their attorneys provide.”).
148. See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOL.
1009 (2003).
149. See Ells et al., supra note 135, at 1130 (noting that youth have difficulty understanding
Miranda warnings).
150. See Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability, & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, 15
CRIM. JUST. 26, 27–29 (2000); Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A
Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333,
356–58 (2003); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and
Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 810 (2005).
151. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.
Ct. 2394, 2405 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2031 (2010); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
152. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2405; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031; Roper,
543 U.S. at 574.

A14_QUINN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/23/2014 9:04 PM

GIVING KIDS THEIR DUE

2209

A. PAST CALLS FOR A COHERENT FAIRNESS FRAMEWORK FOR JUVENILE-DEFENSE
COUNSEL
Over the years a few scholars and youth advocates have, in fact, called
for further embrace of the Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel for
youth. Their work started us down the road towards challenging the
assumption that the right to counsel provided to children under the
Fourteenth Amendment—while different—must necessarily be less
protective or expansive than the right to counsel provided under the Sixth
Amendment.153
For instance, in 2003, Emily Buss critiqued commentators who applied
Gault’s teachings to create a “false dichotomy” of “adult rights or no
rights.”154 As a result of this approach, she argued, youth have been provided
with a “patchwork” of protections seeking to “split the difference” between
these two views.155 Her work begins to suggest something other than a
simplistic, binary view around the right to, and role of, counsel for youth.156
Thus, she called for “a coherent set of due process rights for children.”157
Ellen Marrus offered a similar challenge in a series of articles that
embraced Gault’s due process framework for juvenile representation.158 She,
too, suggested the Due Process Clause might be a better tool for taking
account of the special attributes of juvenile-court proceedings and the
children impacted by them.159 As argued here, Marrus explained that
juveniles need even more assistance than adult defendants as they make
their way through the prosecutorial process.160 Thus, competent
representation should be defined differently for them.
But interestingly, both Buss and Marrus were writing before the
Supreme Court’s previously discussed doctrinal pronouncements, starting in
2005, which modified constitutional standards to take account of adolescent
development theory in cases involving youth. Since that time, others have

153. Cf. Fedders, supra note 48, at 775, 817–18 (claiming that “the right to counsel for
children in delinquency proceedings is more limited in scope than the comparable adult right,”
yet also suggesting further embrace of the Fourteenth Amendment to resolve juvenile court
ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
154. Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 43 (2003)
155. Id.
156. See id. at 43–44; see also Birckhead, supra note 59, at 1468 (“When the expansion of
juveniles’ rights is based solely on the Sixth Amendment, the most likely model will be an adult
criminal court, thereby failing to shift the juvenile justice paradigm.”).
157. Buss, supra note 154, at 43.
158. Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic
Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 298–300 (2003) [hereinafter
Marrus, Best Interests]; Ellen Marrus, Effective Assistance of Counsel in the Wonderland of “Kiddie
Court”—Why the Queen of Hearts Trumps Strickland, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 393 (2003) [hereinafter
Marrus, Wonderland].
159. See Marrus, Best Interests, supra note 157; Marrus, Wonderland, supra note 157.
160. See generally Marrus, Best Interests, supra note 158.
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called for the application of these scientific findings to different features of
the juvenile-justice system—including the right to and role of counsel.161 But
these calls, which seem to apply some hybrid of Sixth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment doctrines, primarily focus on the specific questions
of whether youth should be permitted to waive counsel,162 and how to
evaluate post hoc claims of ineffective assistance.163 Thus, to date, a
comprehensive due process framework for active juvenile-defense
representation has not been formulated.
B. BACK TO BASICS: GAULT’S EMBRACE OF EMERGING VIEWS AND VOICES
In beginning to build a Fourteenth Amendment framework for the
right to, and role of, juvenile-defense counsel, it is important to remember
what Gault actually did—and did not—do. Contrary to the suggestions of
some commentators,164 it did not decide against a robust right to counsel for
youth. It expressly left to another day the question of how early in the
process counsel must enter and how long they must remain.165 The Court
also said the juvenile-court trial proceeding itself might be less formal than a
more public criminal-court trial, thereby arguably limiting the application of
other Bill of Rights protections to juvenile proceedings.166 But it did not
hold that the representation provided to young people should also be
limited in its nature or quality.167
In fact, as noted earlier, the Court did not expressly apply the stringent
Fourteenth Amendment balancing tests that it applied in other decisions
that have sought to determine the role and scope of appointed counsel in

161. See generally, e.g., Jennifer K. Pokempner et al., The Legal Significance of Adolescent
Development on the Right to Counsel: Establishing the Constitutional Right to Counsel for Teens in Child
Welfare Matters and Assuring a Meaningful Right to Counsel in Delinquency Matters, 47 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 529 (2012); see also Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal
Signficance of Adolescent Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In Re Gault, 60
RUTGERS L. REV. 125 (2007).
162. See generally Pokempner, supra note 161; Bishop & Farber, supra note 161; Friedman,
supra note 22.
163. See generally Fedders, supra note 48; Shaheed, supra note 148.
164. See, e.g., Fedders, supra note 48, at 783.
165. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (“We do not even consider the entire process relating to
juvenile ‘delinquents.’ . . . We consider only the problems presented to us by this case.”); id. at
30–31 & n.48.
166. See id. at 25–26.
167. Cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942) (referring to the Fourteenth Amendment
fundamental fairness as “a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other
specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights”), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Yale Kamisar, How Much Does It Really Matter Whether Courts Work Within the
“Clearly Marked” Provisions of the Bill of Rights or with the “Generalities” of the Fourteenth Amendment?,
18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 513, 515–17 (2009) (stating that the “specific” provisions of the
Bill of Rights are not as clear as judges purport them to be).
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civil cases.168 Rather, it looked more broadly and normatively to proposed
best practices of contemporary knowledgeable experts.169 This included
federal executive branch agencies and committees.170 It also cited to
practices of outlying states that had employed greater youth-focused
protections than others.171
It makes sense, therefore, to expand upon this analysis and examine
these data points as we attempt to further develop a Fourteenth Amendment
juvenile right-to-counsel doctrine beyond the trial context. Taking such
evolving standards into account, new juvenile representational rules will
emerge that evaluate what is fundamentally fair to youth in light of their
limited capacities, their specific needs, and the nature of proceedings in
which they may find themselves in conflict with the state.
C. CONTEMPORARY EXPERT AND STAKEHOLDER RECOMMENDATIONS
Reminiscent of Gault’s 1960s, intense investigations and interventions
are taking place across the country today to highlight the shortcomings of
juvenile-court practices in light of modern standards of decency. As already
noted, leading scholar–practitioners have documented the ways in which
young people are often harmed by limited right to representation rules and
practices.172 Their voices underscore the findings of the National Juvenile
Defender Center (“NJDC”), one of the nation’s most respected juvenilejustice organizations, which has shed light on juvenile-court practices that
are out of step with modern norms.173 NJDC has documented instances
across the country where youth are not being provided with counsel.174
Beyond this, its assessments show that even when they are, the culture of

168. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (“Neither
do we address what due process requires in an unusually complex case where a defendant ‘can
fairly be represented only by a trained advocate.’” (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
788 (1973))); cf. id. at 2523 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This is consistent with the conclusion
that the Due Process Clause does not expand the right to counsel beyond the boundaries set by
the Sixth Amendment.”).
169. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 37–41.
170. Id. at 38–39.
171. Id. at 37–38, 40–41.
172. See, e.g., Fedders, supra note 48, at 795–98; Levick & Desai, supra note 52, at 187;
Sterling, supra note 55, 660–75.
173. See About Us, NAT’L JUV. DEFENDER CENTER, http://www.njdc.info/about_us.php (last
visited May 20, 2014) (“All children [are entitled to] legal representation that is clientcentered, individualized, developmentally and age appropriate, and free of bias . . . .”).
174. See, e.g., PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., GEORGIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2001), available at http://www.njdc.
info/pdf/georgia.pdf; MARY ANN SCALI ET AL., NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MISSOURI: JUSTICE
RATIONED, AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF JUVENILE DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2013), available at http://www.njjn.org/
uploads/digital-library/Missouri-Justice-Rationed-Assessment-of-Access-to-Counsel-NJDC-2013.pdf.
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juvenile court in many places works to impede the work of juvenile-defense
attorneys and undermine a youth’s ability to receive meaningful advice and
representation before, during, and after trial.175
Most recently NJDC studied the state of Missouri, where it discovered
that approximately 60% of young people negotiate juvenile-court
proceedings without representation, that court staff often discourage
attorney representation, and that systemic barriers impede representation
when it is provided.176 In finding that such practices were fundamentally
unfair and inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of Gault, NJDC offered
specific recommendations for improvements in the days ahead—
improvements which include an expanded, more holistic juvenile defense
system that appoints lawyers as early as possible in the process, represents
youth throughout the proceedings, and better accounts for the
developmental stage of juveniles.177
Over the last five years, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
has both helped to fund the expert investigative efforts of NJDC,178 and
undertaken its own studies and investigations of juvenile-court systems across
the country.179 DOJ’s work has yielded similar findings and calls for change.
For instance, it has recently issued reports relating to the practices in two
different jurisdictions—Meridian County, Mississippi and Memphis,
Tennessee—which it found to be substandard in light of Gault’s
fundamental fairness dictates.180 Many of the deemed violations relate to
inadequate representation for youth throughout the juvenile-court process,
including in post-disposition probation proceedings.181 In response to these
175. SCALI ET AL., supra note 174, at 52.
176. Id. at 34–38.
177. Id. at 55–58.
178. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder Announces $6.7
Million to Improve Legal Defense Services for the Poor (Oct. 30, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/October/13-ag-1156.html (describing over $1 million in
grants awarded to the National Juvenile Defender Center “in order to improve juvenile indigent
defense across the nation”).
179. Rights of Juveniles, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/juveniles.php
(describing its mission as including the protection of civil “rights of youth involved in the juvenile
justice and detention systems” and announcing recent investigations of juvenile court systems) (last
visited May 20, 2014).
180. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Releases Investigative
Findings on the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee (Apr. 26, 2012),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crt-540.html; Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Releases Investigative Findings Showing Constitutional
Rights of Children in Mississippi Being Violated (Aug. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-crt-993.html; see also Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Announces Investigation of the St. Louis County Family
Court, (Nov. 18, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/November/13-crt1232.html.
181. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE SHELBY COUNTY
JUVENILE COURT 48 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
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findings, Memphis has established an entirely new system for the delivery of
juvenile-court representation, which is intended to be expansive,
developmentally appropriate, and holistic in its approaches.182
Thus, not unlike the reports and studies of bar associations, the
President’s Crime Commission, and federal Children’s Bureau which served
as the basis for many of the United States Supreme Court’s findings in
Gault,183 today’s juvenile justice think tanks and executive agencies are
providing similar expert analyses and determinations that should help frame
modern Fourteenth Amendment right-to-counsel norms in juvenile-court
prosecutions. In fact, the shared concerns of the nation’s leading defenders
and prosecutors reflect the fact that we are in an historic moment—not
unlike the moment that inspired the due process revolution of the 1960s.
D. MODEL STATE PRACTICES IN MODERN AMERICA
At the time Gault announced a juvenile right to defense counsel at trial,
many states were already providing such a right. Indeed, the Court looked to
these states as it determined how a modern juvenile court should operate.
Similarly, today, a number of jurisdictions already appear to provide more
expansive representation rights for juveniles than what was expressly set out
in Gault.184 These rules, which appear to better reflect developmental
differences between youth and adults, and the differences in adult- and
juvenile-court proceedings, may further serve to inform a modern
Fourteenth Amendment framework relating to juvenile-defense counsel.185

shelbycountyjuv_findingsrpt_4-26-12.pdf (“Against the backdrop of a court culture that
frequently discourages an adversarial testing of facts for children and misinterprets the proper
role of defense counsel, the Juvenile Defenders in JCMSC are challenged to meet ethical and
professional obligations to their clients.”).
182. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Enters into Agreement to
Reform the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee (Dec. 18, 2012) available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crt-1511.html (county agreed to
“[e]stablish a dedicated juvenile defender unit in the public defender’s office that will be
independent of the court and have the structure and resources to provide independent, ethical,
and zealous representation for children”); see also Lurene Kelley, Juvenile Defense Reform in Shelby
County Draws National Attention, MEMPHIS LAW. 6, 6–7 (Nov. 2013), available at
http://content.yudu.com/Library/A2kv0a/November2013/resources/8.htm (under the DOJ
agreement, juvenile defenders in Memphis “must be highly specialized attorneys, skilled in
dealing with families, knowledgeable in brain development and childhood trauma”).
183. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38–39 (1967) (citing to the work of the President’s Crime
Commission and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s Children’s Bureau as
providing persuasive authority for the Court’s determination that representation during a
juvenile court trial is a constitutional right).
184. See Samuel M. Davis, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 284–85 (2d ed. 2013) (describing how
some jurisdictions have expanded the right to counsel for juveniles beyond what was described
in specific factual circumstances presented in Gault and Kent).
185. See Fedders, supra note 48, at 782 (explaining that Gault failed to fully “consider how
immaturity and cognitive underdevelopment would affect youths’ ability to exercise their newly
granted due-process rights” including the right to counsel).
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For instance, several jurisdictions appear to require appointment of
juvenile counsel before formal courtroom presentment. For example, both
Iowa and Indiana expressly provide that the right to counsel attaches as early
as pre-charge custodial interrogations—generally seen as an investigative
stage of the prosecutor’s work and excluded from the Sixth Amendment.186
Missouri also provides that a child has the right to counsel during the
informal adjustment interview process.187 Here, too, at least in theory, this
provides an acknowledgement that a child should benefit from the guiding
hand of counsel even before formal charges are processed to help a child
understand the consequences of agreeing to informal probation through
diversion, and protect the child’s right to silence and against selfincrimination.188
As any interrogation would appear to be covered under these more
expansive rules, it does not appear that the protection of representation is
limited under these rules to a singular allegation as defined by a singular
charge under the criminal code. That is, the right that attaches appears to
be more fluid and expansive than the Sixth Amendment’s “charge-focused”
or “offense-specific” analysis, which looks to the moment when a particular
case has moved from the investigative stage to the formal prosecution to
decide when the right to representation in that particular matter attaches.
While some states now provide for juvenile-defense representation
earlier than might be required under the Sixth Amendment, others require
such representation for a longer period time than that necessarily
contemplated by the Sixth Amendment. For instance, in Kansas once an
attorney is appointed, that individual is required to continue to represent
the child for “all subsequent court hearings.”189 This appears to contemplate
not only trial and dispositional hearings, but later proceedings such as
probation review or other post-dispositional matters. In Massachusetts,
similar practices recently have been developed, resulting in postdispositional representation being provided to over 1400 youth since

186. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11 (1)(a) (West 2006); Bridges v. State, 299 N.E.2d
616, 617 (Ind. 1973) (interpreting Gault as requiring “the assistance of counsel at any
interrogation that may take place” in juvenile proceedings).
187. MO. ANN. R. § 113.03(a) (West 1999) (“If the juvenile and the juvenile’s custodian
appear at the informal adjustment conference without counsel, the juvenile officer shall inform
them at the commencement of the conference of the right to counsel under Rule 116.01 and
the right of the juvenile to remain silent.”). Of course, what is on the books and what is
practiced is sometimes quite different, as suggested in NJDC’s Assessment of Missouri’s Juvenile
Courts. See SCALI ET AL., supra note 174, at 17. But as drafted Missouri’s Juvenile Court Rule
113.03 does contemplate an expansive and robust right to representation—even before charges
have been formally lodged.
188. See MO. ANN. R. § 113.03 (a) (West 1999).
189. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2306 (b) (West 2008) (“An attorney appointed for a juvenile
shall continue to represent the juvenile at all subsequent court hearings . . . including appellate
proceedings, unless relieved by the court upon a showing of good cause. . . .”).
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October, 2011.190 This extended duration of juvenile representation is
consistent with best practices as outlined by the National Juvenile Defender
Center,191 Models for Change,192 and other modern juvenile-justice
experts.193
Indeed, rather than adopting the kind of “critical stage” analysis that
has developed under the Sixth Amendment that myopically hones in on
particular phases of the process, some state statutory schemes embrace a less
technical and more holistic view of representation once the right attaches
for juveniles. Several states considered relatively conservative when it comes
to the rights of criminal defendants provide more robust representational
rights for accused youth. Florida,194 Georgia,195 and Louisiana196 all provide
youth with representation at “all stages” of the juvenile proceeding—without
modification relating to the kind or significance of the stage.
E. SOME FURTHER IMPLICATIONS: JUVENILE DEFENSE BEYOND OFFENSE
Taken together, these authorities suggest at least a rough sketch for the
way forward as we establish a uniquely juvenile-court-focused Fourteenth
Amendment framework for the right to, and role of, defense counsel.
Contrary to concerns expressed in the past, such fundamental-fairness
representational principles would likely protect vulnerable young people—
in juvenile court’s unique proceedings—even more than their adult
counterparts. By way of example, this can be seen in the case of a youth who
has been charged with one crime, appointed counsel, and then becomes a
person of interest in conjunction with a second crime—unfortunately a

190. NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., ADDRESSING THE LEGAL NEEDS OF YOUTH AFTER
DISPOSITION 2 (2013), available at http://njdc.info/pdf/rcp_innovations/Post_Dispo_-_Inno
_Brief_2013.pdf.
191. NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENSE STANDARDS 127 (2012)
available at www.njdc.info/pdf/NationalJuvenileDefenseStandards2013.pdf.
192. Strategic Innovations: Efforts to Improve Juvenile Indigent Defense System Policies or Practices,
MODELS FOR CHANGE, http://www.modelsforchange.net/about/Action-networks/StrategicInnovations.html (last visited June 3, 2014) (“Without competent counsel at every stage of the
legal process, including post-disposition, youth may be deprived of fundamental legal
protections, and needlessly suffer any number of serious and lifelong consequences attendant
to juvenile adjudications.”).
193. See, e.g., Sandra Simkins, Marty Beyer & Lisa M. Geis, The Harmful Use of Isolation in
Juvenile Facilities: The Need for Post-Disposition Representation, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241 (2012).
194. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 8.165(a) (West 2008 & Supp. 2014) (counsel to be provided “at
each stage of the proceeding”); see also State v. T.G., 800 So. 2d 204, 210 (Fla. 2001)
(reiterating right to counsel and each stage and enhanced protections against waiver of
juvenile-defense counsel as compared to criminal defense counsel).
195. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-6 (b) (West 2007) (right to counsel applies to “all stages of any
proceedings alleging delinquency”).
196. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. Art. 809(a) (2004 & Supp. 2014) (“At every stage of
proceedings under this Title, the accused child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel at
state expense.”).
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scenario that presents itself with some frequency in both juvenile and
criminal courts.
Under standard Sixth Amendment principles a child would not
necessarily have a right to appointed counsel in conjunction with the
investigation of a second crime.197 Therefore, if adult-criminal court rules
apply, law enforcement might be permitted to interrogate that youth and
take other actions in pursuit of charging them in the second case—all
without conferring with the juvenile-defense attorney who was appointed in
conjunction with the first charge.
But as discussed, modern evolving standards demand special concern
for children as a class based upon the determination that they are less
developed than adults. Moreover, our courts seek to treat young people as
individuals, in light of all of their behaviors and needs, when determining
the best rehabilitative course. Thus, under such a framework—one
supported by the calls of leading experts for a more meaningful, holistic,
and age-appropriate representation for youth—the second crime should not
be carved out as a separate matter for representation purposes.198 Instead, in
effectively representing the whole child, juvenile-defense counsel should be
seen as the attorney of record for the subsequent matter so as to preclude
police interrogation and otherwise defend the child’s interests during the
processing of that case. Accordingly, counsel’s appointment should be
thought of as child-specific, rather than charge-specific under the
Fourteenth Amendment.199
Since the scope of representation would be assessed in light of the
needs of a reasonable child in a modern society, there might be further
implications for the role of juvenile-defense counsel under the Due Process
Clause. For example, while adult defendants are presumed capable of
identifying and raising constitutional claims relating to the system in which
they find themselves, the same cannot be said for youth. Thus, to effectively
serve as juvenile-defense counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment, such
attorneys might also be expected to engage in systemic litigation whenever
necessary to protect their clients as a class. Raising detention center

197. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177–80 (1991) (holding a defendant’s invocation
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in on proceeding does not constitute a Fifth
Amendment invocation for all other crimes); see also, e.g., State v. Wilson, 826 S.W.2d 79 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1992) (finding there was no Sixth Amendment violation when police questioned a
youth, who was awaiting appointment of an attorney for his criminal, because his juvenile
defense attorney had been an attorney for “a different matter”—the adult certification).
198. Thus, not only would the McNeil rule be abrogated for court-involved youth, but Montejo
would be similarly inapplicable for juveniles. See supra note 90, 200 and accompanying text.
199. Cf. Brooks Holland, A Relational Sixth Amendment During Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 381 (2009) (suggesting an attorney-client centered Sixth Amendment right in
the context of adult criminal proceedings, rather than an offense-specific right).
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conditions200 and disproportionate minority contact concerns201 could easily
be seen as essential to preserving fundamental fairness for young people in
conflict with the law—while clearly beyond the scope of Sixth Amendment
counsel.202 In this way, juvenile-defense counsel would also be charged with
holding the system accountable.
VII. CONCLUSION
On this fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright, it is time to rethink
the future of the right to, and role of, counsel in this country—taking full
account of Gideon’s unfilled promises and failings. This Essay has specifically
called for revisiting and re-envisioning the right, and role of, juvenile
counsel. It suggests that we might return to In re Gault and the Fourteenth
Amendment to establish a more meaningful and robust conception of
effective juvenile-court representation, rather than repeatedly looking to
Gideon and Sixth Amendment doctrine for guidance as has been suggested
for decades by commentators.
When leading juvenile-defender groups—and the nation’s top
prosecutor—both agree that juveniles are not sufficiently represented in our
courts, we have clearly arrived at another historic moment. These views, as
was the case during the due process revolution of the 1960’s, should inform
contemporary fundamental-fairness analyses. Armed with recent findings
about adolescent development and competence, and in light of the unique
nature of such proceedings as they have evolved over time, we should
reconsider lawyer competence within juvenile prosecutions to ensure
greater justice for court-involved youth. To meaningfully counter the ways in
which juvenile court actors increasingly encroach upon the lives and futures
of still-evolving youthful defendants—most of whom are youth of color—the
right and role of juvenile-defense counsel under the Fourteenth
Amendment must be similarly rich, responsive, and evolutionary.

200. See, e.g., CTR. FOR CHILDREN’S LAW & POLICY, FACT SHEET: INDEPENDENT MONITORING
SYSTEMS FOR JUVENILE FACILITIES (2012), available at http://www.cclp.org/documents/
Conditions/Fact%20Sheet%20%20Independent%20Monitoring%20Systems%20for%20Juven
ile%20Facilities.pdf (recommending independent monitors for juvenile detention centers to
prevent neglect and abuse, and highlighting the Public Defender Service for the District of
Columbia as a model program serving in such a role for its clients); Sandra Simkins, Marty
Beyer & Lisa M. Geis, supra note 192 (urging defenders to represent youth throughout
disposition so that conditions of confinement issues can be discovered and addressed).
201. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 59; Moriarty, supra note 59; see also OFFICE OF THE
JUVENILE DEFENDER, ADDRESSING DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT (DMC) IN JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY COURT (2011), available at http://www.ncids.org/JuvenileDefender/Guides/
AddressingMinorityContact.pdf (instructing North Carolina juvenile defenders to engage in
zealous advocacy around the issue of disproportionate minority representation).
202. I seek to further explore this component of an expanded role for juvenile-defense
counsel, including proposing special next friend standing rules, in a work in progress currently
entitled: (Im)mobilizing Youth.

